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THE STRUCTURE OF THE EPPO:  
FEATURES AND CHALLENGES
Prior to the adoption of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 
October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establish-
ment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the structure of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office was highly debatable because 
of its status, powers and relations with other EU bodies and national 
authorities. This article analyses the EPPO structure originally con-
ceived in the Commission’s Proposal for an EPPO Regulation, then 
moves on to the Office’s structure as is currently envisaged in the 
EPPO Regulation, explaining the differences. This structure poses two 
challenges: the (claimed) independence of the EPPO in those Mem-
ber States where public prosecutors are not entirely independent of the 
executive, and the (potentially) complex implementation of the EPPO 
Regulation in those systems where the investigating judge (juge d’in-
struction) still plays a prominent role in criminal investigations and 
prosecutions. It can be concluded that the EPPO Regulation may bring 
changes in national legal orders that go well beyond the limited field of 
the protection of the Union’s financial interests.
Keywords: The European Public Prosecutor’s Office, EPPO, EPPO 
structure, independence of prosecutors, EPPO regulation
1. INTRODUCTION 
The structure of theEuropeanPublic Prosecutor’sOffice (EPPOor the
“Office”)wasoneofthemostdebatedissuesduringthenegotiationsthatled
to the adoption ofCouncilRegulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12October 2017
implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European
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minesthestatusandpowersoftheOffice,aswellasitsrelationswithotherEU
bodies and national authorities, it is unsurprising that the structure of the















the structureof theEPPOaswasoriginally conceived in theCommission’s
ProposalforanEPPORegulation,3whichwastabledinJuly2013(section2).
TheanalysiswillthenmoveontotheOffice’sstructureasiscurrentlyenvis-









Truly Prosecution Service?” (2013) 4New Journal of European Criminal Law 7, 7–10;K
Ligeti,“TheEuropeanPublicProsecutor’sOffice”inVMitsilegas,MBergströmandTKon-
stadinides(eds),Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law(EdwardElgar2016)480;FGiuf-
frida,“TheEuropeanPublicProsecutor’sOffice:KingwithoutKingdom?”CEPSResearch
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2. THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL:  






so-called “decentralised/integrated” model. The denomination “integrated”
hasadoublemeaning:fromastructuralpointofviewtheintegratedEPPO
wouldconsistofa“head”atthecentralleveland“arms”intheformofdele-
gates in theMemberStates.From theviewpointof available resources, the
integratedmodelwouldbenefitfromtheexistingresourcesbothatthenational
and EU level.






4 Ligeti, “The European Public Prosecutor’s Office” (n 2), whereupon the following
remarksdraw.
5 Commission, “StaffWorkingDocument. ImpactAssessmentAccompanying thePro-
posal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s
Office”SWD(2013)274final,33(hereinafter:“EPPOImpactAssessment”).
6 The debate on the structure of theEPPO historically focused on fourmodels: i) the
so-called “Eurojust plus”model; ii) the college-typemodel; c) thedecentralised/integrated
model; and iv) the centralisedmodel. For an in-depth analysis of the differentmodels see
LigetiandSimonato(n2)10ff.SeealsoAMet-Domestici,“TheEPPOattheEuropeanLevel:
InstitutionalLayout andConsequences of theLinkswith theNationalLevel” inCNowak
(ed),The European Public Prosecutor’s Office and National Authorities(WoltersKluwer&
CEDAM2016)35ff.
7 CorpusJurisIntroducing Penal Provisions for the Purpose of the Financial Interests of the 
European Union,underthedirectionofMDelmas-Marty(Economica1997).Thefirstversion
of the Corpus Juris wasthenreworkedbythestudygroupthatdraftedit,andthesecondedition
(“Corpus Juris 2000”)canbefoundinMDelmas-MartyandJAEVervaele(eds),The Implemen-
tation of the CorpusJurisin the Member States(Intersentia2000),alongwithsomestudieson
thecompatibilityofnationallegalsystemswiththattext.ThestructureoftheEuropeanPublic




andMPawlik(eds),The European Public Prosecutor’s Office. An Extended Arm or a Two-
Headed Dragon?(TMCAsserPress&Springer2015)61–62.
36
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centrallevel.PursuanttotheCommission’sProposal,theEDPswouldbein
chargeoftheinvestigationsandprosecutionsunderthe“directionandsupervi-
sion”9 of theEuropeanPublic Prosecutor. TheEuropeanPublic Prosecutor
retained, under somecircumstances, thepower to conduct the investigation
directlyandreallocatethecasetoanotherEDP.10 












put forward and passionately defended. It will thus remain an unanswered
questionwhetherthemodelendorsedbytheCommissionwouldhaveturned
outtobeeffectiveinpractice,asonemaywonderwhetherthatsmallcentral





advocated ever since the Corpus Juris.15 AlthoughtheEDPswouldworkfor
theEPPOoncasesofcrimesaffecting theUnion’sfinancial interests (“PIF










14 VMitsilegas,EU Criminal Law after Lisbon (Hart2016)105.
15 SeeArt18(3)oftheCorpus Juris 2000. 
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other offences.17According to theCommission, thedouble-hatmodel is the
best guarantee to ensure both coherent (through central and hierarchical deci-
sion-making) and effective prosecutorial action (through local law enforce-





























The European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Challenges Ahead(Springer2018)143ff.
20 Art11(4)of theCommission’sProposal.For someextensive remarkson the issueof
whethertheEPPOshouldhaveexclusiveorsharedcompetenceonPIFcrimessee,eg,PAsp,
“JeopardyonEuropeanLevel–WhatistheQuestiontowhichtheAnsweristheEPPO?”inP
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theMember State level, but a comparison between two possible modes of 
action at the Unionlevel”.26Therefore,inbothcases,itcannotbesaidthatthe
subsidiarityprincipleisviolated.Finally,theCommissionacknowledgedthat
suchprinciplecancomeintoplayalsowithregardtotheOffice’sstructure,
since this structure should be conceived in away that allows theEPPO to
achieveitsmission,sothatitcanbearguedthattheproposedaction(stronger
protectionoftheUnionbudget)can“bebetterachievedatUnionlevel”.27In




the European Commission’s Hasty Approach to National Parliaments’ Subsidiarity Argu-
ments”(2015)16German Law Journal1247;DFromage,“TheSecondYellowCardonthe
EPPOProposal:AnEncouragingDevelopment forMember State Parliaments?” (2016) 35




25 ibid 10. 
26 ibid(emphasisadded).
27 Art 5(3) TEU. 
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forumchoice), and, as argued immediatelybelow, theymanaged tofindan
agreementonsuchacollegiatestructure.
3. THE REGULATION 




The Regulation retains the idea of a single office – “indivisible Union
body”31–withacentralofficeanddecentralisedenforcementintheMember















34 Art 13(1). 
35 SeemoreinArt13(3).
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sions on prosecutions and slow down the decision-making process of the
Office.Furthermore,acollegialstructuremayallowpursuingnationalinter-
estsinthefieldofjudicialcooperation,inthiswaycontraveningtheneedto










37 Art 13(2). 





39 InOctober 2019, after some tense political armwrestling, the European Parliament
andtheCouncilfinallyagreedonthenameofthefirstEuropeanChiefProsecutor,whowill
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are entitled to monitor and direct the investigations and prosecutions con-
ductedbytheEDPs.43Incontrast,theCollegehasmostlymanagementfunc-
tions and shall nottakeoperationaldecisionsinindividualcases,butmaytake
decisionsrelatedtostrategicmattersormattersofgeneralapplicationarising
out of individual cases.44TheEuropeanChiefProsecutor is theheadof the
EPPOandrepresentstheOfficevis-à-vistheotherEUbodiesandagencies,as
















inDKBrown, J IontchevaTurnerandBWeisser (eds),The Oxford Handbook of Criminal 
Process(OUP2019)159.
42 Art10(1).The internal rulesofprocedureshallbeadoptedby theCollegebya two-
thirdsmajority,upontheproposaloftheEuropeanChiefProsecutor(seeArt21).
43 Art 10(2). 
44 Art 9(2).This is therefore a remarkable difference between theEPPOandEurojust,
sincetheEurojustCollegehasoperationalpowers(seemoreinGiuffrida(n2)14–15).
45 Art 11. 
46 Inaddition, theEuropeanChiefProsecutor iscompetent tomakea reasonedwritten
request for liftingprivilegesor immunities,when suchprivilegesor immunitiespresent an
obstacletoaspecificinvestigationbeingconducted(seeArt29).
47 Cfrecital30of theEPPORegulation.Inexceptionalcases, theEuropeanProsecutor
maybeauthorisedbythecompetentPermanentChambertoconducttheinvestigationperson-
ally(seeArt28(4)).
48 Art 12(5). 
42
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another EDP;52 if EDPs do not agree on the measures to be adopted in
cross-bordercases,thePermanentChambersdecideontheissue.53 At the end 
oftheinvestigations,thedivisionofcompetenceisreversedandthekeydeci-
sionsontheproceedings–bringingthecasetoacourtordismissingit,relying
on simplified prosecution procedures, or sending the case back to national






theywill have thenecessary expertise and information todeviate from the
EDPs’decisions.56Intheliterature,Ðurđevićhighlightsthatthelanguageissue
willbeofcrucialimportanceintheframeworkofEPPOactivitiesandmay







50 Art 12(4). 
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4. TWO CHALLENGES STEMMING FROM THE EPPO 
STRUCTURE 
4.1. Independence of the EPPO and its members 
Albeitaccountable to theEuropeanParliament, theCommissionandthe
Councilforitsgeneralactivities,59theEPPOshallbeindependent.60 As Article 
6oftheRegulationstates,themembersoftheOffice(namely,theEuropean
Chief Prosecutor and deputies, the European Prosecutors, the EDPs, the
AdministrativeDirector,andthestaffoftheEPPO)shall“actintheinterestof
theUnionasawhole,asdefinedbylaw,andneitherseeknortakeinstructions
fromanypersonexternal to theEPPO,anyMemberStateof theEuropean
Unionorany institution,body,officeoragencyof theUnion in theperfor-
manceoftheirdutiesunder[the]Regulation”.61TheindependenceoftheEPPO
57 ZÐurđević,“LegislativeorRegulatoryModificationstobeIntroducedinParticipant
MemberStates to theEnhancedCooperation” inMFidelbo (ed), International Conference 
on Enhanced Cooperation for the Establishment of the EPPO(FondazioneBasso2018)103.
58 KLigeti,MJoãoAntunesandFGiuffrida,“Introduction”inKLigeti,MJoãoAntunes
andFGiuffrida(eds),The European Public Prosecutor’s Office at Launch. Adapting National 
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hasbeenacentral themeeversince the ideaofestablishingasupranational
prosecutorwasborn.Intheacademicdebate,inparticular,clearsupportforan
independentEPPOdatesbacktotheCorpus Juris,whichexpresslyadvocated






only if theCourtof Justice–upon referralby theCommission,Councilor
EuropeanParliament–findsthattheEuropeanChiefProsecutororaEuro-
peanProsecutorisnolongerabletoperformhisorherdutiesorisguiltyof
seriousmisconduct.64Onemayhoweverwonderwhether the external inde-
pendenceoftheEPPOcanbefullysafeguardedbythestructureatthecentral















62 Art18(2)oftheCorpus Juris 2000. 
63 Significantly,appointmentsarenon-renewable.SeeArts14(1)(EuropeanChiefProse-
cutor)and16(3)(EuropeanProsecutors).ThisshouldreducetheriskoftheEuropeanChief
Prosecutor orEuropeanProsecutors indulging in obliging or opportunistic attitudes in the
hopeofbeingreappointed.Foracritique,consideringthecomplexstructureoftheRegulation,
seeJAEVervaele,“CriminalInvestigationandProsecutionsbyaEuropeanPublicProsecu-
tor’sOfficeintheEU:DiMeliora”inRKertandALehner(eds),Vielfalt des Strafrechts im 






66 Art 17. 
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prosecutorisformallyembeddedinthejudiciaryorderandindependentfrom
theexecutivepower;andiii)systemsinwhichtheprosecutorisconsideredas




featureoftheNapoleonictradition68 and can still be retraced in several conti-


















contentious in theNetherlands. This country decided to join the enhanced




68 Thestronghierarchicaldependenceof theprosecutorunder theNapoleonic tradition




indifferentEuropeancountriessee,forinstance,MZwiers,The European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office. Analysis of a Multilevel Criminal Justice System(Intersentia2011)37ff,aswellasthe
severalcontributions inKLigeti (ed),Toward a Prosecutor for the European Union,vol1
(Hart2013).
70 Council,“ParticipationoftheNetherlandsandMaltaintheCouncilRegulationimple-
menting enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s
Office(“theEPPO”)”,Councildoc12683/18.
46
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instead a heightened degree of independence of the public prosecutor as a




trates enjoying a similar degree of independence vis-à-vis the government.
Bothsystemsoptedforstrongprosecutorialindependenceasareactiontoear-
lierexperiencesofabuseoftheprosecutorialfunctionbytherulingparties.In
thesameperspective, systemssuchasHungary’shaveopted for“full inde-
pendence”throughasui generisconfigurationoftheprosecutionservice,so
that it formallybelongsneither to theexecutivebranchnor to the judiciary.


















by JoinedCasesC-508/18 andC-82/19PPU,OG and PI, EU:C:2019:456,where theCourt
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4.2. Relations between the EDPs and the juge d’instruction
TheinherentandgroundbreakingfeatureoftheEPPORegulationisthatit
aimstounify–for thefirst timeinEUlaw–thepretrialphaseofcriminal
proceedings. So far, otherEU instruments havemostly aimed to harmonise
someaspectsofthisphase(e.g.,defencerights)ortoprovidenationalauthori-
tieswithmutualrecognitioninstruments,whichrepresentakeytoolinthepar-







pretrial procedure constitutes a single procedural phase that starts with the
openingoftheofficialinvestigation,includespreparationoftheindictmentand
thefilingofcharges,andrunsuntilthebeginningofthetrial.Othersystems
divide the pretrial procedure into two distinct phases: a preparatory phase
referred to as information,andaformaljudicialinvestigationcalledinstruc-
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takespecific investigativemeasures,define the investigativestrategy,and in
somecasescarryoutinvestigativeactshimselforherself.Thepublicprosecu-
tors are thecentral actorsof thepretrialphase, although for somecoercive
measures(interceptionoftelecommunications,certaintypesofsearches,etc)
theyneedtheauthorisationofapretrialjudge,suchastheErmittlungsrichter 
inGermanyortheGiudice per le indagini preliminari inItaly.Itisimportant
tohighlightthatratherthansystematicallysupervisingtheinvestigation,pre-
trialjudgesinsuchsystemsareinvolvedad acta–uponrequestofthepublic
prosecutor– for the authorisationof a specificmeasure.76 In these systems,




endorsed this approach, in other continental systems the powers to direct






counterbalance the role of the procureur.IncontrasttoItalianorGermanpre-
trialjudges,theinvestigatingjudgenotonlyauthorisesinvestigativemeasures
butco-conductstheinvestigation.InFrance,forinstance,thejuge d’instruc-
tion conducts the instruction, a judicial investigation that ismandatory for
seriouscrimes,optionalformisdemeanours(délits),andexceptionalforpetty
offences (contraventions).Whenaninstructionisopened,thejuge d’instruc-
tioncandirect thepolice throughso-called“rogatory letters”(commissions 
rogatoires).Thisgivestheinvestigatingjudgethedouble,ambiguousnatureof




strategy. In those systems, theEDPswillhave to share thedirectionof the
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required.TheRegulationitselfdoesnotimposeanychangeonnationalcrim-













suggest legislative changes in the sense of enhancing the investigative auton-
omyofthepublicprosecutorsactingasEDPsinthePIFdomain.81Inrecent

















the Juge d’Instruction fromtheLuxembourgPerspective”inLigeti,JoãoAntunesandGiuf-
frida(eds)(n58)192–194.
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catalystforreneweddebatesonwhetherthefigureofthejuge d’instruction is 



















of the statusofpublicprosecutorsand their relationswith the investigating
judgedemonstrate.This isnot entirely surprising since theadoptionofEU
instrumentsofcriminaljusticehasoftenprovidedtheMemberStateswitha
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2. Asp,P.,“JeopardyonEuropeanLevel-WhatistheQuestiontowhichtheAnsweristhe
EPPO?”inAsp.,P.(ed),The European Public Prosecutor’s Office – Legal and Criminal 










6. CorpusJurisIntroducing Penal Provisions for the Purpose of the Financial Interests of 
the European Union,underthedirectionofMDelmas-Marty(Economica,1997).
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suradnje na uspostavi europskog javnog tužiteljstva strukturaUreda europskog javnog tu-
žiteljabilajepredmetdugihraspravasobziromnatodaupravonjegovastrukturaodređuje
statusiovlastiureda,aliiuređujeodnosesdrugimtijelimaEU-atesnacionalnimvlastima.
VažnojenapomenutidanauspješnostostvarenjamisijeUredautječemogućnostbrzogiučin-
kovitogdjelovanja,kojesemožepostićisamoagilnomstrukturom.Uztopredmetrasprave
biojeisamlegitimitetUredaEJT-auočimagrađanaEU-aprilikomstvaranjatijelakojeje
strukturomsličnodrugojpostojećojkaznenopravnojagencijiEU-a–Eurojustu.Ukonačnici
trebaimatinaumudadržavečlaniceželeosiguratikontrolunadsvojimkaznenopravnimsu-
stavima,atose(barprividno)ostvarujeupravoispreplitanjemstruktureUredasastrukturom
nacionalnih tijela. 
UraduserazmatrastrukturaUredaEJT-apremaizvornomprijedloguKomisijezaUred-
buoUreduEJT-aiz2013.godine.ZatimseanaliziratrenutačnopredviđenastrukturaUre-
daUredbomoUreduEJT-a,pričemuseistodobnoupućujenarazlikeuodnosunaprvotni
prijedlogKomisije.Nakontogaautoricaseusredotočujenadvaizazovakojatrenutačnastruk-
turapredstavlja:naproblematičnostneovisnostiUredaEJT-audržavamačlanicamaukojima
javnitužiteljinisuupotpunostineovisnioizvršnojvlastitenaotežanuprovedbuUredbeo
UreduEJT-ausustavimaukojimaistražnisudacjošuvijekimaistaknutuuloguukaznenoj
istraziiprogonu.UzaključkuautoricanavodidajenastrukturuUredaEJT-autjecalonasto-
janjedržavačlanicadazadržesvojuproceduralnuautonomijutedabiimplementacijaUredbe
unekimdržavamačlanicamamoglaimati„učinakprelijevanja“idovestidopromjenauna-
cionalnimpravnimsustavimakojeznatnonadilazeograničenopodručjezaštitefinancijskih
interesa EU-a.
Ključneriječi:Uredeuropskogjavnogtužitelja,strukturaUredaEJT-a,neovisnost tuži-
telja,UredbaoUreduEJT-a
